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Welfare Reform in a Global Economy
Steven D. Schwinn*
I. INTRODUCTION
Just over ten years ago, Congress and the Clinton administration passed
perhaps the most significant piece of domestic social legislation since the
New Deal. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act,' more commonly known as federal "welfare reform,"
was unquestionably important in terms of its new requirements for welfare
recipients. But it was perhaps equally important as a reflection of the federal
government's broader conception of the proper roles of the government and
welfare recipients in a government income support program.
More particularly, welfare reform reflected the federal government's
priority of work as a critical way for recipients to gain economic
independence from welfare.2 The new welfare program thus required
recipients to work (or to prepare for work, through an educational program)
in exchange for their welfare checks, 3 and, as a motivator, it limited the
4
amount of time any recipient would be eligible to receive welfare benefits.
These provisions were thought simultaneously to promote economic
independence among welfare recipients and to reduce or eliminate any
perverse economic incentives that may have existed under the previous
program to stay on (better paid) welfare and avoid the (worse paid) job

* Associate Professor of Law, The John Marshall Law School. This paper is based on the author's
presentation at The Journal of Gender, Race & Justice symposium, One Act, Ten Years, and
Thousands of Families: Welfare Reform in Contemporary America. The author wishes to thank the
members of the Journal for hosting a truly outstanding symposium and for their excellent editorial
work on this paper. All errors are, of course, my own. The author also wishes to thank his fellow
panelists and other symposium participants for thought-provoking presentations and discussions,
which contributed to the development of this article.
1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (2000) (stating that a purpose of welfare reform is to "end the
dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and
marriage").
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(l)(A) (2000) (setting out the requirements for state plans,
including certification of recipients' work activities, in order to receive the federal block grant); 42
U.S.C. § 607 (setting out the mandatory work requirements for recipients).
4.

42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2000).

HeinOnline -- 11 J. Gender Race & Just. 209 2007-2008

The Journalof Gender, Race & Justice

[11:2008]

5

market.
At the same time, the federal government sought to devolve much of
the responsibility for welfare reform to the states, giving states greater
flexibility to design programs better tailored to their individual needs. The
federal government effected this devolution through a block grant to each
state, the level of which depended at least in part upon the state's success in
placing recipients in the job market.6 Thus, the federal government assigned
to the states the responsibility of carrying out its priority and mandate of
putting recipients to work.
If states had complete control over their labor markets, this kind of
devolution might make some sense (leaving aside other significant problems
with this scheme). States could, for example, adjust their macroeconomic
levers to encourage growth and job creation in sectors that could provide
well-paid, long-term, sustainable jobs with good health care, child care, and
retirement benefits. States could then place their welfare recipients in these
good jobs under their welfare reform programs, achieving the federal
mandate of moving recipients from welfare to work. In other words, an
individual state could influence the demand side of the labor market so that
its welfare recipients on the supply side could move from welfare to good
jobs and thus achieve economic self-sufficiency.
7
But as it is, states do not significantly control their labor markets.
Instead, the U.S. domestic labor market is increasingly shaped by
globalization. 8 In a global economy, state labor markets are more and more

5.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-725, at 262 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2649, 2650 ("For the first time ever, able-bodied welfare recipients will be required to
work for their benefits."); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-

1980 9 (1984) (arguing that AFDC rules made receiving welfare more attractive than working). But
see David T. Ellwood & Lawrence H. Summers, Is Welfare Really the Problem?, 83 Pub. Int. 57
(1986) (finding little evidence that welfare policies increased the unemployment rate by reducing
work incentives). For discussions about the meaning of work in a welfare-to-work program, see
generally Noah D. Zatz, What Welfare Requires from Work, 54 UCLA L. REV. 373 (2006)
(examining the normative underpinnings of welfare-to-work requirements); Amy L. Wax, Something
for Nothing: Liberal Justice and Welfare Work Requirements, 52 EMORY L. J. 1 (2003) (examining
the normative underpinnings of welfare-to-work requirements); Amy L. Wax, A Reciprocal Welfare
Program, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 477 (2001) (exploring the reciprocity principle in welfare-towork requirements). For histories of work and welfare, see generally Larry L. Orr & Felicity
Skidmore, The Evolution of the Work Issue in Welfare Reform, in WELFARE REFORM IN AMERICA
(Paul M. Sommers ed. 1980); Joanna Weinberg, The Dilemma of Welfare Reform: "Workfare"
Programsand Poor Women, 26 NEw ENG. L. REV. 415 (1991).
6.

42 U.S.C. § 603 (2000).

7.

See infra Part 11.

8.

See generally LORI G. KLETZER, JOB LOSS FROM IMPORTS:

MEASURING THE COSTS

(2001) (measuring the effects of trade liberalization on the U.S. labor market); J. Bradford Jensen &
Lori G. Kletzer, Tradable Services: Understandingthe Scope and Impact of Services Outsourcing,

The Peterson Institute for International Economics (May 2006), available at http://www.
petersoninstitute.org/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchlD=638
(analyzing the effects of
outsourcing on the service sector).
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the product of international economic forces, including federal government
economic policies related to globalization. 9 Relative to global forces and the
federal government, individual states have comparatively little control over
the size, shape, and composition of their labor markets,' 0 yet they must
nevertheless deal with their internationalized labor markets by finding good,
economically sustainable jobs for their welfare recipients. And in the global
I1
economy, these jobs are becoming more and more scarce.
Federal welfare reform's devolved welfare-to-work mandates thus
require the states to move their welfare recipients to economically
sustainable jobs without giving them the full set of policy instruments to
succeed. More particularly, states must move recipients from welfare to
work in a political environment where only the federal government-not the
states--controls the macroeconomic levers that impact the domestic
economy. And states have to do this in a global economic environment that
seems to be handing them exactly the wrong kinds of jobs.
This article explores some of the tensions between welfare reform and
globalization. It first describes how the federal government-not the
states-controls the primary macroeconomic policy instruments to influence
the domestic labor market. And because states must deal with the domestic
labor market in putting their welfare recipients to work, the devolution of
welfare-to-work mandates is in tension with the federal political order in a
global economy.
Next, it argues that globalization has produced actual labor market
adjustments in the United States such that available jobs for welfare
recipients are increasingly unlikely to provide the means for sustainable,
long-term economic independence. As the domestic labor market has
adjusted to globalization over the past decade or so, it has moved away from
a manufacturing base, with relatively well-paid and stable jobs, to a servicesector base.' 2 New service-sector jobs are at one of the two opposite ends of
the education and income ranges, demanding either high education for wellpaid managerial and professional jobs, or compensating relatively poorly for
low-education jobs in human services, food services, and facilities
maintenance. 13 When welfare recipients lack the higher or specialized

9.

See infra Part II (arguing that the federal government, not the states, controls the

macroeconomic levers that shape state labor markets in a global economy).
10.

Id.

11.

See infra Part Ill (arguing that labor market trends in the U.S. suggest that jobs available to

welfare recipients in a global economy are low-paying, part-time, temporary, seasonal, without
benefits, or otherwise unable to sustain workers over the long term).
12.

See infra Part Ill (examining labor market trends and arguing that the U.S. economy has

moved away from a manufacturing-based economy to a service-sector economy).
13.

Id. (reviewing labor market trends that show that the growing service sector is producing

jobs that are either high-income-requiring specialized or advanced education--or low-income).
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education to attain managerial or professional service-sector jobs (as they
often do), states must place welfare recipients in education and training
programs to qualify for higher-paid managerial and professional servicesector jobs or place them in lower-paid, economically unsustainable jobs.
Neither option is very appealing for the states: the former option involves
greater expense and pushes against the federal limits on education and
training as a welfare reform "work activity"; 14 the latter option simply
rotates recipients back into the ranks of the working poor or into a cycle of
poverty. And regulations pursuant to reauthorization of welfare reform in the
Deficit Reduction Act of 200515 only tightened states' abilities to use
education and training as work requirements' 6 and stiffened work
requirements, 17 nearly ensuring that states will adopt the latter option out of
short-term expediency and thus create something like a permanent
underclass to staff the new low-skill, low-paying service-sector jobs
resulting from forces in the global economy.
Welfare-to-work as a welfare reform program cannot achieve its
economic goals over the long term by devolving job-placement
responsibility to the states in our federal system and in a global economy.
The future of welfare reform therefore needs to address the fundamental
federalism and labor-market tensions. If it intends to succeed as a devolved
welfare-to-work program, it must significantly loosen its work participation
requirements and its requirements limiting how education counts toward
workforce participation rates in order to give states more flexibility to
prepare and place workers in a globalized labor market. These changes
would help states adopt the truly flexible programs needed to place welfare
recipients in economically sustainable jobs in a market that is mostly not of
their design or creation. Short of adopting these changes, welfare reform can
only succeed as a devolved program by becoming a trade adjustment
assistance program or an unemployment insurance program-i.e., a program
that provides a safety net for workers who lose their jobs because of trade or
globalization-and not a program that seeks to move recipients from welfare
to work.

14.

42 U.S.C. § 607(c) (2000).

15.

Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 136 (Feb. 8, 2006).

16.
45 C.F.R. § 261.33 (2007); see Reauthorization of the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families Program, 71 Fed. Reg. 37,454-01, 37,460-37,461 (June 29, 2006) (explaining the tighter
requirements to use education and training as part of a state's work participation rate under the new

regulations).
17.
45 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-36 (2007); see Reauthorization of the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families Program, 71 Fed. Reg. 37,454-01, 37,457-37,459 (June 29, 2006) (discussing the
stricter work requirements under the new regulations).
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II. FEDERALISM TENSIONS

The federalism tensions in welfare reform arise as a result of the federal
government's nearly exclusive authority to set macroeconomic policy and
thus shape the domestic labor market in a global economy. Even though the
states have little or no control over federal economic policy and global
economic forces, they nevertheless are left to deal with the effects of
globalization by trying to place welfare recipients in a state job market
largely created by federal policy and globalization. The net result is a deep
tension between welfare reform's devolved mandate to states to put welfare
recipients to work, on the one hand, and states' relative lack of control over
the shape and composition of the domestic job market, on the other. This
section explores some of the trade and trade-related economic policies
through which the federal government alone largely shapes the domestic
labor market in a global economy.
A. Trade
The federal government's powers over international and foreign affairs
are broad and exclusive, even if they are not expressly recited in the U.S.
Constitution.' 8 In the area of international economic affairs and trade,
however, the federal government's plenary powers are clear: unlike the
federal government's more general powers in foreign affairs, the federal
government's exclusive powers over international trade and commerce are
specifically delineated in the Constitution.' 9 For example, by the plain terms
of the Constitution, only Congress may "regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations"2 0 and "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, '21 and
only the president has the power to "make Treaties." 22 States, on the other
hand, are specifically prohibited from "lay[ing] any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its inspection Laws ' 23 and from "enter[ing] into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation." 24 Moreover, under the Supremacy Clause 25 Congress has

18.
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); see Zschemig v. Miller,
389 U.S. 429 (1968) (holding that states may not intrude into foreign affairs).
19. See John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and Separation of Powers Under the
United States Constitution, 13 DICK. J. INT'L L. 203 (1995) (providing a more detailed discussion of
the relative powers of international commerce as between Congress and the President).
20.

3 (the "foreign commerce clause").
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.

21.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.I (the "import-export clause").

22.

2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.

23.

2.
U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 10, cl.

24.

1.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
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the power to preempt state laws, 2 6 and state laws may not conflict with a
federal statute or treaty.27
The upshot of these provisions is that states have an extremely narrow
range within which they may regulate foreign trade. And in any event, they
may not regulate foreign trade as such, discriminating in their policies by,
say, countries of origin or foreign goods of a particular economic sectorthe way Congress might. Therefore, states may not seek to encourage or
discourage particular imports (again, the way Congress might) in an effort to
protect their own industries or to advantage or disadvantage particular
countries or particular foreign goods. Instead, any state regulation or tax of
foreign trade must not uniquely burden international trade in relation to
domestic trade and must not interfere with federal trade policy. 28 In short,
"[i]n international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse and trade
the people of the United States act through a single government with unified
29
and adequate national power."
At the same time, the federal government influences the economic
conditions in the states through trade agreements initiated, negotiated, and
implemented at the federal level. States have little influence on these
agreements, yet they must deal with the economic effects of them through
their devolved state welfare reform policies.
This section first examines limits on state involvement in regulating
international trade. It then examines some ways in which the federal
government regulates trade, with effects on state economies.
1. State Limitations on Regulating International Trade
Three provisions of the U.S. Constitution restrict states in their ability
to affect their local labor markets through international trade: the Dormant
Foreign Commerce Clause, 30 the Import-Export Clause, 3' and the
Supremacy Clause. 32 This subsection briefly examines each.
The Supreme Court, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,

25.

U.S. CONST. art. Vl,cl. 2.

26.

Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824); Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533

(1912).

27. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941) (holding that a state law is preempted
when it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress").
28.

Bd. of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 59 (1933).

29.

Id.

30.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.

31.

U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.1.

32.

U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl.
2.
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defined the narrow range of allowable state taxes affecting foreign
commerce under the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. 33 The Court ruled
that the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause restricts state regulation of
foreign commerce even more than the Dormant Commerce Clause restricts
state regulation of interstate commerce. 34 Thus, "[w]hen a State seeks to tax
the instrumentalities of foreign commerce, two additional considerations,
beyond [the traditional Interstate Commerce Clause considerations], come
into play." 35 First, "taxes [must] be apportioned among taxing jurisdictions,
so that no instrumentality of commerce is subjected to more than one tax on
36
its full value ...[and] no jurisdiction may tax the instrumentality in full."
Second, state taxes must not "impair federal uniformity in an area [like
foreign commerce] where federal uniformity is essential. 37
The Court's rationale for these additional considerations under the
Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause reflects and underscores the federal
government's preeminence over the states in the area of foreign commerce:
A state tax on instrumentalities of foreign commerce may frustrate
the achievement of federal uniformity in several ways. If the State
imposes an apportioned tax, international disputes over reconciling
apportionment formulae may arise. If a novel state tax creates an
asymmetry in the international tax structure, foreign nations
disadvantaged by the levy may retaliate against American-owned
instrumentalities present in their jurisdictions. Such retaliation of
necessity would be directed at American transportation equipment
in general, not just that of the taxing State, so that the Nation as a
whole would suffer. If other States followed the taxing State's
example, various instrumentalities of commerce could be subjected
to varying degrees of multiple taxation, a result that would plainly
prevent this Nation from 'speaking with one voice' in regulating
38
foreign commerce.
In other words, state policies discriminating against (or in favor of)
certain foreign countries or certain foreign goods in order to effect state
economic goals run up against principles of national economic interest.
States may not run their own international trade policies because doing so
may adversely affect other states and the nation as a whole. Such state
policies are therefore unconstitutional under the Dormant Foreign

33.

Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).

34.
Id. at 446 ("When construing Congress' power to 'regulate Commerce with foreign
nations,' a more extensive constitutional inquiry is required.").
35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 447.

37.

Id. at 448.

38.

Id. at 450-51.
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Commerce Clause.
The Court in Japan Line thus overturned a California ad valorem
property tax on Japanese shipping companies' cargo containers that were
based, registered, and subjected to full property tax in Japan, because the
California tax resulted in "multiple taxation of the instrumentalities of
foreign commerce." 39 Similarly, the Court in Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa
Dep't. of Revenue and Fin. overturned a state law that treated dividends
from foreign subsidiaries less favorably than dividends from domestic
subsidiaries. 40 More recently, the Fifth Circuit in Piazza's Seafood World,
LLC v. Odom overturned a state labeling law that allowed only catfish grown
in the United States-and not catfish grown outside the United States-to
41
carry the label "catfish."
In contrast, the Court has upheld under the Dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause state taxes that do not inevitably result in multiple taxation.42 But
these allowable state taxes may only tax economic activity within the state
and may not discriminate against particular foreign goods.43 Thus, states are
virtually helpless under the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause to effect
state economic policy in relation to foreign trade.
While the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause severely restricts such
state policies, they are even further curbed by the Import-Export Clause.
Like the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 44 the Import-Export Clause
demands that the federal government speak with one voice on regulation of
international commerce and that states' policies be consistent with each
other. 45 But the Import-Export Clause adds that state policies may not divert
import tax revenues from the federal government,4 6 thus adding yet one
more impediment to the states' ability to effect state economic policy

39.

Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979).

40. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 79 (1992) (holding
that the state law violated the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, even where the state's economy
was not a direct beneficiary of the policy).
41.

Piazza's Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 751-52 (5th Cir. 2006).

42.

See, e.g., Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (holding

that a California corporate franchise tax based on a domestic-based multinational corporation's
payroll, property, and sales in California did not result in multiple taxation and therefore did not
violate the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause); Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S.
60 (1993) (holding that a Tennessee sales tax based on in-state proceeds from leases did not result in
multiple taxation and therefore did not violate the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause); Barclays
Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994) (holding that the California tax at
issue in Container Corp. as applied to domestic corporations with foreign parents or to foreign
subsidiaries did not violate the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause).
43.

See supra notes 30-42.

44.

Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 76 (1993).

45.

Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1976).

46.

Id.

HeinOnline -- 11 J. Gender Race & Just. 216 2007-2008

Welfare Reform in a Global Economy

through foreign trade.
Finally, federal preemption and the Supremacy Clause foreclose the
states' ability to implement economic policies or regulations in areas where
Congress has "occup[ied] the field ' 47 or where state law conflicts with a
federal statute.4 8 The most notable recent example of preemption and the
Supremacy Clause restricting a state's policies in international trade comes
from Massachusetts's "Burma Law." 49 That law restricted Massachusetts
state agencies from purchasing goods or services from companies doing
business with Burma (also known as Myanmar) as a response to political
repression and other human rights abuses by the Burmese military
government. 50 The Supreme Court ruled that the law was inconsistent with
federal law imposing sanctions on Burma 5 1 and that it was therefore invalid
52
under the Supremacy Clause.

47. California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100-02 (1989) (holding that federal
antitrust laws do not occupy the field of antitrust, and thus preempt state laws, where "Congress
intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies").
48.

Id. at 100-01; Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1941).

49.
1996 Mass. Acts 239, ch. 130 (codified at Mass. Gen. Laws §§ 7:22G-7:22M). See
Terrence Guay, Local Government and Global Politics: The Implications of Massachusetts' "Burma
Law", 115 POL. SCi. Q. 353 (2000) (providing an overview of Massachusetts's Burma Law). For
analysis of Massachusetts's Burma Law in the context of federalism and states' abilities to enact
trade sanctions, see Alejandra Carvajal, State and Local "Free Burma" Laws: The Casefor SubNational Trade Sanctions, 29 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 257 (1998); Jennifer Loeb-Cederwall,
Restrictions on Trade with Burma: Bold Moves or Foolish Acts?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 929 (1998);
Brian Owens, The World Trade Organization and States' Rights: Will Foreign Threats Over
Massachusetts' Burma Law Lead to a Domestic Backlash Against InternationalTradeAgreements?,
21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 957 (1998). For similar discussions of states' South Africa
laws, see Peter Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the
Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813 (1986); Lynn Berat, Undoing and Redoing
Business in South Africa: The Lifting of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 and the
Continuing Validity of State and Local Anti-Apartheid Legislation, 6 CONN. J. INT'L L. 7 (1990).
State sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s were not preempted, because they were consistent
with the federal Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Mayor &
City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 744-49 (Md. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
50. Nat'l Foreign Trade Counsel v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass. 1988) ("The
Commonwealth concedes that the statute was enacted solely to sanction Myanmar for human rights
violations and to change Myanmar's domestic policies. Indeed, its legislative history makes this
intent clear.").
51.
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997, §
570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 to 3009-167 (enacted by the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act,
1997, § 101(c), 110 Stat. 2009-121 to 2009-172).
52. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373-74 (2000). The lower court
held that the Massachusetts law also violated the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and the federal
government's exclusive power over foreign relations. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181
F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Antilles Cement Corp. v. Vila, 408 F.3d 41 (lst Cir. 2005)
(remanding the case to determine whether Puerto Rico's law prohibiting the use of non-Puerto Rican
cement in construction projects funded by Puerto Rico or by the United States was consistent with
the federal Buy American Act, and thus whether the Puerto Rican law was unconstitutional under the
Supremacy Clause).
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Notwithstanding the application of the Supremacy Clause to the
Massachusetts Burma Law, an international development in this case

perhaps even more manifestly illustrates the lack of authority of the states in
international trade. Soon after Massachusetts enacted its Burma Law, the
European Union (EU) and Japan filed complaints with the World Trade

Organization (WTO) claiming that the law violated provisions of the
Agreement on Government Procurement.5 3 Both parties agreed to suspend
the WTO proceedings pending the outcome of the litigation in U.S. courts,

but they or other WTO member nations are free to reinstate complaints for
state laws like the Burma Law that infringe upon U.S. commitments under
international trade agreements. 54 Because individual U.S. states have no

standing at the WTO,55 their attempts to regulate international trade in a
manner inconsistent with U.S. policy and U.S. international commitments
may be wholly at the mercy of an entirely different level of governmentthe WTO.56
To be sure, U.S. law does permit some very limited state involvement
federal
international trade policy. For example, the federal statute
in
enacting the latest round of the Uruguay Agreements requires consultation
between the United States Trade Representative and the states.5 7 But it also
58
requires states to cooperate with the federal government in WTO disputes,
and it prohibits the invalidation in U.S. courts of any state law on the ground
that its application is inconsistent with any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements. 59 These provisions only reinforce the constitutional primacy of
the federal government in trade policy.
Despite states' lack of constitutional authority to adopt trade policies,

53.

Crosby, 530 U.S. at 383, n.19.

See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Articles XXII and XXIII, available at
54.
http://www.wto.org/english/docse/legal-e/gatt47-e.pdf (establishing procedures for enforcement of
trade agreements under the GATT); Final Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Dispute Settlement Understanding, available at http://www.wto.org/englishldocs-e/
legal-e/28-dsu.pdf (incorporating the principles of GATT Articles XXII and XXIII and setting out
the rules for trade dispute settlement at the WTO).
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Articles XXII and XXIII (permitting only
55.
"contracting parties" to a trade agreement to lodge a dispute at the WTO); Final Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Dispute Settlement Understanding (permitting
only WTO "members" to lodge a trade dispute at the WTO). Article XXXIII of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade limits membership by accession to those governments that possess
"full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations." The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (1994) incorporated this provision and adopted this limitation for WTO
membership. See supra notes 30-52 and accompanying text (explaining why U.S. states do not
qualify for WTO membership).
56.

But see infra note 60 and accompanying text.

57.

19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(l)(A) & (B) (2000).

58.

19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(1)(C) (2000).

59.

19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2)(A) & (B) (2000).
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states nevertheless have developed expertise in international trade in order to
attract new investment, to promote exports of goods and services produced
within their borders, and-to the extent possible under constitutional
60
restrictions-to protect their local industries from import competition.
While these efforts certainly have some impact in terms of interstate
competition for investment and promotion of exports of local goods and
services, their impact is far less significant in terms of international
competition for investment and promotion and protection of local industries
61
on the international stage.
In short, constitutional restrictions on the states' ability to implement
international trade policies designed to promote and protect local industries
and jobs, and more generally to effect positive economic development
within the state, are extremely limited. Yet international forces are
increasingly important to states' economic prospects. The net result is that
states are increasingly unable to forge their desired path of economic growth
unilaterally; they are more and more at the mercy of the international
economy, regulated in part through U.S. trade policy, over which states have
little control. Thus, when the federal government devolves welfare-to-work
policies and mandates to the states, it creates a tension: the federal
government demands that states succeed in moving welfare recipients into
the workplace while states have less and less influence over the size and
shape of their economies and workforces.
2. Federal Regulation of International Trade
States' lack of power over trade policy is amplified by the federal
government's exertion of its power, particularly since the early 1990s-a
period significantly overlapping with welfare reform. That period has seen
an extraordinary amount of activity in international trade, and most of it has
opened up or liberalized trade. The federal government has negotiated and

60.

See generally The National Governors Association "Best Practices" on International Trade

and Competitiveness, http://www.ncsl.org (select "Social, Economic, & Workforce Programs" from
the NGA Best Practices menu; then follow "International Trade and Competitiveness") (last visited
Feb. 9, 2008) (providing resources for governors related to state trade policies); The National
Conference of State Legislatures "Issue Area" on Economic Development and Trade,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/econ/et.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (providing resources for state
legislatures related to state trade policies); State of California Business, Transportation, and Housing
Agency,
Economic
Development
Programs
and
Initiatives,
http://www.bth.ca.gov/
programsinitiatives/itp.asp (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (outlining California's trade initiatives to
attract foreign investment and increase California's exports).
61.
States compete with each other for foreign investment and export promotion on equal
footing, i.e., they are all subject to the same federal trade policies. But they do not compete with
foreign nations for foreign investment and export promotion on equal footing (in the way
economically autonomous nations compete with each other) because they do not significantly
control their own terms of trade. In other words, the impact of states' trade efforts in relation to
foreign countries is constrained by their inability to set their own trade policies.
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implemented multilateral trade agreements, regional free trade agreements,
and a host of bilateral trade agreements, which has liberalized trade in both
goods and services. 62 While there is some dispute as to the precise
magnitude of the impact of these agreements (and even how to measure the
these agreements have
impact of the agreements), there is a consensus that
63
had an important impact on the national economy.
The early 1990s saw three major developments in U.S. trade policy that
moved the United States toward more liberalized trade with major trading
partners. First, the Clinton Administration promoted, and Congress narrowly
passed, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which opened
trade between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. 64 NAFTA debates
were particularly contentious, as detractors argued that it would result in the
loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs to Mexico as manufacturers moved plants
south in search of cheaper labor.65 Disputes resulted in environmental and
labor "side-agreements," designed to mitigate harm to the environment and
adverse economic effects of NAFTA.66 Second, the Clinton administration
hosted the 1993 Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in
Seattle in an attempt to patch-up trade tensions with Japan and China-two
major trading partners-and to open U.S. trade relations with the APEC
region, the fastest-growing region in the world.6 7 The Administration
granted continuing most-favored nation status to China but made such status
68
contingent upon compliance with certain human rights norms in the future.

62.

See The Office

of the United States

Trade

Representative,

Trade

Agreeements,

http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Section-Index.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2008) (providing a
list of trade agreements to which the United States is a party).
63. There is a vast body of literature arguing the effects of trade in the U.S. economy (and
what, if anything, to do about it). Authors agree that international trade affects local labor markets,
but they do not always agree that this is an insurmountable problem. For two examples on the protrade side of the debate, see JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION, 228-39 (2004)

(recognizing that liberalized trade impacts labor markets and arguing for policies to mitigate the
effect on workers); and MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS 178-79 (Yale Univ. Press
2004) (discussing the impact of trade on U.S. manufacturing jobs). For two examples on the antitrade, or fair-trade, side of the debate, see generally Jeremy Rifkin, New Technology and the End of
Jobs, in THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Jerry Mander and Edward Goldsmith eds.,
Sierra Club Books 1996) (arguing that technological changes in a global economy are leading to a
changed U.S. labor market); and JEFF FAUX, THE GLOBAL CLASS WAR: HOW AMERICA'S
BIPARTISAN ELITE LOST OUR FUTURE-AND WHAT IT WILL TAKE TO WIN IT BACK (2006) (arguing
that unfettered free trade impacts domestic labor markets and creates a global underclass). See also
I.M. DESTLER, AMERICAN TRADE POLITICS 314-16 (4th ed. 2005) (reviewing some of the effects of

international trade on U.S. labor markets).
64.
Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat 2057 (1993). NAFTA passed the House of Representatives
by a 234 to 200 vote; it passed the Senate by a 61 to 38 vote.
65.

DESTLER, supra note 63, at 199-206.

66.

Pub. L. No. 103-182, Tit. V, Subtit. D, Pt. I. (1993).

67.

DESTLER, supra note 63, at 206-08.

68.

Exec. Order No. 12,850, 3 C.F.R. 607 (1993). "Most favored nation" treatment (also called
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Third, the Uruguay Round of international trade negotiations wrapped up,
culminating in a host of trade liberalization agreements and the formation of
the WTO, a new trade and dispute resolution body to succeed the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 69 The substantive coverage of the
Uruguay Round was comprehensive, but its sweep was especially notable: as
of September 1994, it included 125 member countries; today the WTO
70
includes 151 member countries, accounting for over 97% of global trade.
Since the early 1990s, the U.S. has initiated or completed a host of
additional bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade negotiations. 71 For
example, the U.S. implemented the Central American and Dominican
Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) in August 2005.72 Other
significant agreements, such as the WTO Doha Round and the Free Trade
73
Area of the Americas (FTAA), remain on the table.
Most economists agree that trade liberalization, like that promoted in
these agreements, yields net gains in output or gross domestic product
(GDP), suggesting that net employment effects should be positive.74 But
economists also agree that trade liberalization yields adjustment between
sectors as countries move to find new comparative advantages under the
more liberalized regime. 75 This adjustment translates into lost jobs in certain
sectors and gains in others.76 These adjustments may vary across states,
depending on an individual state's economic base and its place in the global
economy. In short, state welfare reform programs are likely to face a state
"nondiscriminatory treatment") for a country means "treatment based on normal trade relations." 19
U.S.C. § 2481(9) (2000).
69.
DESTLER, supra note 63, at 208-11; see generally World Trade Organization,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/whatise.htm
(providing information about the
background, history, and formation of the WTO) (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).

70. The World Trade Organization in Brief, at 7, available at http://www.wto.org/
english/res-e/doload e/inbr e.pdf; see generally World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org
(providing general information on the WTO) (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
71.
See generally The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, http://www.ustr.gov/, for
background, status, and the United States's position on these and other international trade
agreements.

72. Dominican Republic-Central America-United
Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 109-53, 119 Stat. 462 (2005).

States

Free

Trade

Agreement

73.

See generally supra note 71.

74.

See Scott C. Bradford, Paul L.E. Grieco & Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Payoffto America

from Global Integration, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD ECONOMY 65-109 (C. Fred
Bergsten ed. 2005) (estimating that the long-run gain to the U.S. by removing all its trade barriers is
between $1,500 and $2,000 per capita, annually).
75.
See RICHARD E. CAVES, JEFFREY A. FRANKEL & RONALD W. JONES, WORLD TRADE AND
PAYMENTS, 25-27 (10th ed. 2007) (describing the theory of comparative advantage in international
trade); see also DAVID RICARDO, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION, 81-99

(1971) (setting out the classical case for comparative advantage).
76.

See supra note 63.
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labor market that has evolved in important ways through trade policies of the
federal government-forces over which the states have little or no control.
Moreover, when states are impacted by unfair or illegal international
trade, they have little or no standing to challenge or remedy those effects. As
discussed above, states have marginal protections under the WTO, but they
are not parties to the WTO.77 Thus, only the federal government, not the
states, may initiate a challenge to foreign trade practices under the WTO.7 s
Here is just one relatively recent example: the federal government
represented U.S. interests in the dispute with the EU over U.S. subsidies to
Boeing and EU subsidies to Airbus, and the federal government alone
determined whether to lodge two complaints against the EU and its member
countries that its government subsidies to Airbus ran afoul of their
obligations under certain provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures Agreement and the GATT. 79 The federal
government spearheaded these efforts, notwithstanding the fact that the
80
employment effects were felt primarily in a handful of states.
On the other side of the coin, only the federal government defends
complaints by other countries against its own trade policies, often designed
to protect American jobs. For example, the federal government alone
unsuccessfully defended a complaint by a number of countries that the
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 200081 violated U.S.
obligations under the WTO Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Agreements and
the GATT. s2 The federal government alone engaged foreign countries
through the WTO process, even though effects of its decisions and those of
the WTO were felt in state labor markets.
When trade disputes go to the WTO or a similar dispute settlement

77.

See supra note 55 and accompanying text.

78.

The AFL-CIO criticizes the Bush Administration for its failure to use the WTO dispute

settlement process to challenge unfair or illegal trade practices of trading partners that affect
American jobs. AFL-CIO Issue Brief, p. 4 (Aug. 2004), available at http://www.aflcio.org/issues/
jobseconomy/jobs/uploadlbushrecord-jobsoverseas.pdf.

79.

Dispute Settlement, European Communities and Certain Member States-Measures

Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS347 (Jan. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/casese/ds347-e.htm;
European
CommunitiesMeasures Affecting Trade in Large Aircraft, WT/DS 316 (Oct. 6, 2004), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/casese/ds3l6_e.htm.
80.
See generally Nils Meier-Kaienburg, The WTO's "Toughest" Case: An Examination of the
Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Resolution Procedure in the Airbus-Boeing Dispute over Aircraft
Subsidies, 71 J. AIR L. & COM. 191 (2006) (providing background and an overview of this dispute).
81.

Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-387, 114 Stat.

1549A, codified at 19 U.S.C. § 1675c (2000).
82.
WT/DS

Dispute Settlement, United States-Continued Dumping & Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
234 (Jan. 16, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/

casese/ds234_e.htm.
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body, states are twice removed: only the federal government-not the
states-has standing before the body, and the body-not the federal
government or the states-renders a decision that affects the states. But even
U.S. domestic programs that are designed to remedy unfair or illegal trade
practices by trading partners are controlled by the federal government, not
the states. Thus, for example, Section 301 of the Trade Act of 197483
authorizes the president to take certain retaliatory actions to redress unfair
trade practices by other countries. 84 The president's use (or nonuse) of
Section 301 has been the subject of serious domestic criticism; it clearly is a
discretionary power that is not 85
always used to promote fair trade and
economic growth within the states.
Thus, the federal government is the primary, if not exclusive, sovereign
responsible for initiating, negotiating, and implementing significant
international trade agreements. States have little or no formal role in this
area; they are, in fact, specifically precluded from involvement under
federalism principles. 86 As a result, states are left to deal with the domestic
economic effects of international trade agreements through their devolved
welfare reform programs even though they have little to no influence over
those economic effects.
B. Federal Trade-RelatedPolicies
In addition to trade policy, the federal government has exclusive
constitutional authority over myriad non-trade policies that nevertheless
impact international trade. This section discusses just a few, dividing them
into monetary policy and fiscal policy.
1. Monetary Policy
Monetary policy-manipulating the quantity of money in circulation in
order to achieve certain macroeconomic goals-is the exclusive

83.

19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2005).

84.

Id.

85.
For example, the AFL-CIO filed a "Section 301 petition" on June 8, 2006, asking the Bush
Administration to investigate and take retaliatory actions against China. The petition alleged that

Chinese violations of workers' rights hurt U.S. workers and communities because multinational
corporations moved U.S. jobs to China and because multinationals producing in China undercut U.S.
manufacturers, resulting in U.S. job losses. The petition is available at http://www.aflcio.org/
issues/jobseconomy/globaleconomy/upload/china.petition.pdf. On July 21, 2006, the Bush
Administration in its discretion did not accept the petition. See http://www.ustr.gov/

DocumentLibrary/PressReleases/2006/July/Statement

fromUSTRSpokesmanRegardingChin

a_LaborPetition.html.
86.

See supra Part II.A.1.
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responsibility of the federal government. 87 Monetary policy significantly

impacts economic growth and employment, yet states have no formal role in
creating or implementing monetary policy. Thus, states once again are left to

deal with the economic effects of federal policies when implementing their
welfare reform programs.
Monetary policy is conducted through the Federal Reserve System

(System). 88 Congress created the System in 1913 as the nation's central
bank. 89 The System consists of a seven-member Board of Governors, twelve
regional Federal Reserve Banks, the Federal Open Markets Committee
(FOMC), the Federal Advisory Council, and "member banks"- privately
owned, commercial banks. 90 The System's fundamental charge is to use
monetary policy as a means to serve three macroeconomic ends: to

maximize employment,
to maintain stable prices, and to moderate long-term
91
interest rates.
In order to achieve these ends, the System primarily relies upon three
monetary policy instruments. 92 First, and most importantly, it conducts
open-market operations, in which the FOMC directs the purchase and sale of
federal government securities by the New York Federal Reserve Bank.93
Second, it regulates member bank borrowing from the regional Federal

87. States are prohibited from engaging in policies designed to manipulate U.S. currency by,
among other things, Art. 1, § 10, cl. I of the U.S. Constitution, which states that "[n]o State shall...
coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of
Debts ....
Federal primacy in the areas of monetary and fiscal policies and the national economy is
underscored by the importance of federal policy in reaction to current economic conditions. As this
article goes to print, the Federal Reserve, Congress, and President Bush are negotiating an economic
package-including both monetary and fiscal responses-to stimulate a weakening national
economy. Edmund L. Andrews & David M. Herszenhom, Fed's Chairman is Said to Back Aid to
Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008, at AI & A22.
88. Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For an overview of the Federal
Reserve System, see Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco: The Federal Reserve System in Brief,
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/federalreserve/fedinbrief/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
89. For an excellent abridged history of the Federal Reserve System, see Reuss v. Balles, 584
F.2d 461, 462-65 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that a member of Congress and bondholder lacked
standing to sue over the allegedly unconstitutional composition of the FOMC).
90. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-522 (creating and defining the powers, limits, and scope
of the Federal Reserve System).
91.
12 U.S.C. § 225a ("The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Federal Open Market Committee shall maintain long run growth of the monetary and credit
aggregates commensurate with the economy's long run potential to increase production, so as to
promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term
interest rates.").
92. Committee for Monetary Reform v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 766 F.2d
538, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Riegle v. Fed. Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 462-63 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
93.
12 U.S.C. §§ 353-359. Section 263(b) requires regional Federal Reserve Banks to comply
with the open-market instructions of the FOMC.
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Reserve Banks.9 4 Third, it establishes member bank reserve requirementsthe amount of cash a bank must have on deposit at the Federal Reserve as a
95
percentage of that bank's total loans.
While the System may use these three instruments in any combination
to achieve its macroeconomic goals, the open-market operation is the most
important. 96 In an open-market operation, the FOMC directs the purchase or
sale of bonds in order to manipulate the money supply.97 Thus, the FOMC
may direct the purchase of bonds in order to increase the money supply
(because the Federal Reserve pays for the bonds with money, putting
additional money into circulation), or it may direct the sale of bonds in order
to decrease the money supply (because the Federal Reserve sells bonds for
money, reducing the amount of money in circulation).98
The Federal Reserve's purchase or sale of bonds through an openmarket operation impacts short-term interest rates, investment, economic
growth, and employment. 99 Under a monetary expansion-when the FOMC
directs the purchase of bonds-interest rates decline, investment increases
(because the cost of borrowing to fund investment drops), and output
increases, promoting macroeconomic growth.100 The FOMC may use an
expansionary monetary policy, for example, to move toward its goal of
maximizing employment when there is little risk that lower interest rates will
lead to inflation. Conversely, during a monetary contraction-when the
FOMC directs the sale of bonds-interest rates rise, investment drops
(because the cost of borrowing for investment rises), and output falls,
constraining macroeconomic growth and inflation. 0 1 The FOMC may use a
relatively tight monetary policy, for example, to move toward its goal of
stabilizing prices and reducing inflation. But, depending on other conditions,
10 2
a tight monetary policy may result in lower levels of employment.

94.

12 U.S.C. § 347.

95.

12 U.S.C. § 461.

96.
It is also the exclusive responsibility of the FOMC. Riegle v. Fed. Open Mkts. Comm., 656
F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
97.
RUDIGER DORNBUSCH, STANLEY FISCHER & RICHARD STARTZ, MACROECONOMICS 270
(9th ed. 2004). See U.S. Monetary Policy: An Introduction, http://www.frbsf.org/publications/
federalreserve/monetary/MonetaryPolicy.pdf (last visited Nov. 19, 2007) (providing a general
overview of monetary policy); Cheryl Edwards, Open Market Operations in the 1990s, FEDERAL
RESERVE BULLETIN (Nov. 1997), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/
1997/199711 lead.pdf (providing a more detailed description of the open market operation).
98.

DORNBUSCH, FISCHER & STARTZ, supra note 97, at 270.

99. See id. at Chs. 1I,
operations and their effects).
100.

12, & 16 (providing a background on fiscal policy and open-market

Id.

101.

Id.

102.

See id. at 288-95 (listing examples of monetary policies in particular historical contexts).
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State economic conditions and labor markets are thus clearly impacted
by federal monetary policy, even considering monetary policy only in a
domestic vacuum. Adding international linkages to the story only
underscores the relative unimportance of the states' economic policies in the
global economic order.
Any monetary policy shift by the Federal Reserve impacts-and is
impacted by-international economic factors. Thus, when the FOMC
conducts an open-market operation to manipulate short-term interest rates, it
also affects the exchange rate of the dollar in relation to foreign
currencies.10 3 An expansionary monetary policy should lower interest rates
and simultaneously depreciate the exchange rate. 10 4 A depreciated exchange
rate means that domestic competitiveness increases in world markets in the
short run (because domestic goods become cheaper in relation to foreign
goods), and domestic output and employment increase to meet the new
06
demand for exports.10 5 A tight monetary policy acts exactly the opposite. 1
Other Federal Reserve actions-and actions by other countries' central
banks-similarly impact the U.S. economy. For example, the Federal
Reserve may conduct foreign currency operations-buying and selling
foreign currency in order to manipulate the dollar's value in relationship to
other currencies.107 The dollar's value in relation to other currencies, in tum,
impacts domestic competitiveness and thus affects exports and imports,
08
impacting domestic output, growth, and employment.1
Other central banks may also manipulate their currencies, similarly
affecting exports and imports. In the last couple years, China provides an
extreme example of manipulating currency in order to increase its global
competitiveness. China's policy of artificially pegging its currency at belowmarket value means that goods produced in China are cheaper relative to
goods produced in countries with a "floating" currency-one that is
responsive to foreign exchange markets. 10 9 As a result, China artificially
All else being equal, a higher interest rate resulting from tighter monetary policy will reduce
aggregate income and investment spending, thus likely reducing employment. Id. at Ch. 11.
103.

DORNBUSCH, FISCHER & STARTZ, supra note 97, at 446-47; CAVES, FRANKEL, & JONES,

supra note 75, at 576-78.
104.

CAVES, FRANKEL & JONES, supra note 75, at 577.

105.

See id.

106.

See id.

107.

DORNBUSCH, FISCHER & STARTZ, supra note 97, at 418.

108. See id. (noting, however, that "the Fed frequently pairs foreign exchange purchases with
offsetting open market operations .....
.");
U.S Foreign Exchange Intervention,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed44.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2007) (providing
an overview of U.S. foreign exchange intervention).
109. See Economic Policy Institute, Economic Snapshots: China's Currency Manipulation and
U.S. Trade, http://www.epinet.org/content.cfm/webfeatures-snapshots archiveI0302003se (last
visited Nov. 12, 2007) (providing an overview of the economic effects of China's currency
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increased its competitiveness with trading partners and thus increased its
exports."1 For the United States, this translates into a dramatic trade deficit
with China, lost investment to China, and resulting impacts on domestic
output, growth, and employment."'
Because of these international linkages, the Federal Reserve considers
information and analysis related to both domestic and international
economic factors, from both domestic and international sources. In short, the
Federal Reserve coordinates its monetary policy with other countries' central
banks, " 2 removing U.S. states yet further from the policies that directly
impact their economies. For example, the Bank for International Settlements
in Basel, Switzerland, provides an important forum for the Federal Reserve
to meet and coordinate its monetary policy with that of other central
banks. " 3 Similar coordination occurs through the International Monetary
1
Fund,'' 4 the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 15
and even regional and other specialized forums such as the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation Finance Ministers' Process, 116 the G-8," 7 the G20,1 18 and the Governors of Central Banks of the American Continent. 119
Individual U.S. states are not formal participants in these forums.
Thus, federal monetary policy has obvious and dramatic effects on
domestic economic growth and employment in the states. These effects are
amplified when the monetary policies of other countries and the fallout in
manipulation).
110.

Id.

111.

Id.

112.
See DORNBUSCH, FISCHER & STARTZ, supra note 97, at Ch. 12 (describing the linkages
between countries' monetary policies).
113.

See Bank for Int'l Settlements, http://www.bis.org/about/index.htm (providing information

on the Bank for International Settlements); Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank for Int'l
Settlements, http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed22.htm
2007) (providing information on U.S. participation in the BIS).
114.

(last visited Nov.

12,

See Int'l Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (providing

information on the International Monetary Fund and international economic cooperation).
115.

See Organization of Economic Cooperation & Development, http://www.oecd.org (last

visited Nov. 12, 2007) (providing information on the Organization of Economic Cooperation and
Development and international economic cooperation).
116.

See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, http://www.apecsec.org.sg (last visited Nov. 12,

2007) (providing information on the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation organization and
international economic cooperation).
117.

See G8 Information Centre, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/

(last visited Nov.

12, 2007)

(discussing the G-8 and international economic cooperation).
118.

See G-20, http://www.g20.org/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (discussing the G-20 and

international economic cooperation).
119.
See Press Release, XLIV Meeting of Central Bank Governors of the American Continent,
http://www.cemla.org/actividades/2007-05-governors.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
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the United States are taken into account. States, of course, have no formal
control over monetary policy, and they certainly have little or no role in the
international forums designed to coordinate countries' monetary policies in
the international economy. Therefore, states, once again, are forced to deal
with the economic effects of federal and international policies when
implementing their welfare programs without any meaningful input into
those policies.
2. Fiscal Policy
Like monetary policy, federal fiscal policy-the policy of the
government with regard to government spending (both purchases and
transfers) and taxing-is the exclusive province of the federal government.
Like monetary policy, fiscal policy has obvious and dramatic effects on
domestic growth and employment. And fiscal policy has seen stunning
changes in the last fifteen years or so.' 20 States, of course, conduct their own
fiscal policies with some state-level economic impact, but any state's
individual effect upon the overall U.S. economic picture pales in comparison
to the effects of federal fiscal policy. 12' At the end of the day, the states'
fiscal policies are far less influential in shaping the U.S. economy and labor
markets than federal fiscal policy.
In general, expansionary fiscal policy-a net increase in spending by
the government-tends to raise output, growth, and thus employment, 122 but
it also tends to raise interest rates. 123 Absent accommodating monetary
policy, any rise in interest rates associated with expansionary fiscal policy
will dampen investment, partially or fully offsetting the original gains 1in
25
output or growth. 124 Tight fiscal policy tends to work exactly the opposite.
As with monetary policy, though, the story becomes more complex
when international effects and linkages are considered. 126 For example, by

120.

Between 1990 and 2006, the federal budget increased from $1,253,130 million (21.8% of

GDP) to $2,655,435 million (20.3%ofGDP). Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2005, Table 1.2 23-24, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget! fy05/browse.html. The

deficit moved from $221,036 million in 1990 to a surplus of $236,241 million in 2000 and back to a
deficit of $248,181 million in 2006. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008,
Table 1.1 21-22, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ usbudget/fyO8/browse.html.

121.
The largest state, California, had a revised budget of $102,136.6 million in 2006-2007; the
governor proposed a budget of $103,140.6 million for 2007-2008. Governor's Budget Summary,
2007-2008, available at http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf.
122.

DORNBUSCH, FISCHER & STARTZ, supra note 97, at 261.

123.

Id.

124.
Id. at 268-95. Increased government spending can even "crowd out" private investment
because of the resulting increased interest rates, thus resulting in lower growth. Id. at 280-83.
125.

Id.

126.

See id. at 268-95 (providing a background on monetary policy and its effects on
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manipulating the simple national accounts equation, it becomes clear that the
excess of investment over private savings and fiscal surplus must equal the
trade deficit. 127 Thus, if investment and private savings remain constant,
expansionary fiscal policy (or a decreased fiscal surplus) will yield an
increased trade deficit. In other words, if investment and private savings
remain constant, the fiscal deficit and the trade deficit move in the same
direction.
128
In the 1990s, however, these deficits moved in opposite directions.
That is, the fiscal deficit decreased and even turned into a surplus in the late
1990s, while the trade deficit declined over the decade. 129 This inverse
relationship resulted from a simultaneous surge in investment (as a result of
high growth expectations in the 1990s) and a decline in private savings (that
was simply a continuation of a trend that started as early as the mid1950s).13 ° Post-2000, the deficits moved in the same direction for a period
and most recently seem to have moved in opposite directions again.' 3 ' States
have little control over these inputs, the resulting deficits, or their economic
impacts.
And there is growing concern that the impacts could be significantthat recent high fiscal deficits and current account deficits could trigger a
"hard landing" for the U.S. economy. 132 The classic scenario goes like this:
(1) lenders lose confidence in the U.S. dollar based on high fiscal and trade
deficits; (2) the dollar falls and interest rates rise; and (3) interest rate
increases curb investment and consumption, precipitating a recession. 133 The
net result is that states could be strapped with dealing with the economic
impact of the fiscal and trade deficits through a devolved welfare program,
even as they have little or no influence over the macroeconomic factors that
influence the fiscal and trade deficits.
Fiscal balances influence the economy in other ways too. For example,
except in the case of extreme deficits or other confidence shocks, changes in
the fiscal balance will move the relative value of the dollar in the opposite
direction. Thus, within a normal range, a rise in the fiscal balance (from, say,
international trade and the U.S. economy); WILLIAM R. CLINE, THE UNITED STATES AS

A DEBTOR

NATION, 99-152 (2005).
127.

CLINE, supra note 126, at 101; CAVES, FRANKEL & JONES, supra note 75, at 310.

128.

CLINE, supra note 126, at 101-02.

129.

Id.

130.
Congressional Budget Office, Causes and Consequences of the Trade Deficit: An
Overview, 6-13 (Mar. 2000), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/18xx/doc1897/tradedef.pdf.

131.

CLINE, supra note 126, at 102.

132.

Id. at 174-75.

133.

Id. at 175. Key questions remain and challenge the classic scenario, not least of which is

whether a depreciated dollar would spur exports, thus increasing domestic output, enough to offset
the effects of lost investment and consumption. Id. at 177.
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a slight deficit to a surplus) should spark a drop in interest rates and a
concomitant drop in the exchange rate. 134 In contrast, a drop in the fiscal
balance (from, say, a balance or slight surplus to a slight deficit) should
ordinarily spark a rise in interest rates and a concomitant rise in the
exchange rate.1 35 The dollar's value, in turn, affects competitiveness of U.S.
exports, which thus affects domestic employment. 136 Again, states have little
control over any of these variables or effects.
Given bleak fiscal predictions, states' tasks under welfare reform are
particularly daunting. As a percentage of GDP, fiscal balances have swung
dramatically in the last fifteen years: the fiscal balance reached near -5% of
GDP in 1992 (for a fiscal deficit about 5% of GDP); it rebounded to just
over +2%of GDP in 2000 (for a fiscal surplus just over 2% of GDP); and it
fell again to around -4% of GDP in 2003 and 2004.137 Based on the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis and other studies, the United
States is likely to see fiscal deficits hovering between 3% and 3.5% of GDP
until approximately 2012 or beyond. 138 Longer-term, the fiscal picture looks
potentially much worse' 39-the CBO estimates under modest spending and
tax revenue assumptions that the fiscal deficit could be 6.1% of GDP in
2030 and 14.4% of GDP in 2050, primarily as a result of dramatic increases
40
in Medicare and Medicaid spending as the baby-boom population ages. 1
States have comparatively little control over any of the variables in the
simple national accounts equation linking fiscal deficits with trade deficits.
Investment depends largely on interest rates and national growth
expectations; private savings depends on income; and government spending
means federal government spending. 14 1 Even to the extent that states may
influence these variables, they historically have not done so. For example,
state and local government savings changed comparatively little throughout
the 1990s, thus not contributing one way or another to the national decline in
savings. 142 Since 2000, state and local debt (in the form of long-term
municipal bonds) has skyrocketed to $1.85 trillion, suggesting that state and
local spending may have greater relative impact on state economic

134.

Id. at 109.

135.

Id.

136.

DORNBUSCH, FISCHER & STARTZ, supra note 97, at 306-07.

137.

CLINE, supra note 126, at 102 fig. 4.1.

138.

Id. at 123-24.

139.

Id. at 125.

140.

Id.

141.

CAVES, FRANKEL & JONES, supra note 75, at 310.

142. Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, tbl. D.3 (June 2006)
(showing state and local debt remaining relatively stable through the 1990s).
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opportunities.143 But at least some of this debt reflects a growing trend
among states to securitize anticipated federal grants; 144 to the extent that
state and local debt reflects future federal aid this trend only again reflects
the federal government's primacy. Thus, despite the increase in state and
local government debt burdens over the last seven years, federal fiscal policy
nevertheless plays a relatively much more important -- even if not absolutely
dominant-role in shaping the U.S. labor market. Like federal monetary
policy, then, federal fiscal policy leaves states largely with an economic
situation not of their own creation.
III. LABOR MARKET TENSIONS

Aside from the control that the federal government asserts over
domestic labor markets, the reality of the evolving domestic labor market
with increased globalization creates a second critical tension: current labor
market trends and projected domestic job growth moving jobs away from the
relatively well-paid and stable manufacturing sector and toward the two
opposite ends of the service sector. 145 Job growth is both in high-education
and high-income service-sector occupations and in low-education and lowincome service-sector occupations. 146 These latter jobs often lack the kind of
health benefits, child care benefits, retirement benefits, and stability that
mark a good job that might permit a welfare recipient to move permanently
off welfare and into the workforce. 147 With strict workforce participation
rates and restrictive rules on the use of education and training as part of

143.

ld.

144.

Chris Edwards, State and Local Government Debt is Soaring, 37 CATO INST. TAX &

BUDGET BULL. (2006), availableat http://www.cato.org/pubs/tbb/tbb-0706-37.pdf.
145.

See infra notes 147, 154-55, 164-65, and accompanying text; see also WILLIAM JULIUS

WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996) (providing an

excellent overview of this trend and its impact on inner-city communities).
146. See infra notes 147, 154-55, 164-65, and accompanying text. See also Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Monetary Policy Report to the Congress, July 18, 2007, at
2 ("Job growth in the first half of 2007 was driven by sizable increases in service-producing
industries. In the goods-producing sector, manufacturing employment contracted, especially at firms
closely tied to the construction industry and at producers of motor vehicles and parts.").
147. Demetra Smith Nightingale, Work Opportunitiesfor People Leaving Welfare, in WELFARE
REFORM: THE NEXT ACT 105-07 (Alan Weil & Kenneth Finegold eds., 2002); Julie Strawn, Mark
Greenberg, & Steve Savner, Improving Employment Outcomes under TANF, in THE NEW WORLD
OF WELFARE 226 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds., 2001). See WILSON, supra note 145, at

225 ("Despite some claims that low-skilled workers fail to take advantage of labor-market
opportunities, available evidence strongly suggests not only that the jobs for such workers carry
lower real wages and fewer benefits than did comparable jobs in the early 1970s, but that it is harder
for certain low-skilled workers ... to find employment today."). For more personal accounts of the
challenges faced by workers, see DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA
39-76 (2004); BARBARA EHRENREICH, NICKEL AND DIMED: ON (NOT) GETTING BY IN AMERICA
(2001).
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workforce participation requirements, states are caught between a federal

mandate to move welfare recipients to work and the reality of a job market
in a global economy that is supplying states only with more unsustainable
jobs. This, then, is the labor market tension between welfare reform and
globalization.
Globalization has changed the domestic labor market in important
ways. The general trend is familiar: the U.S. labor market as a whole is
moving from a manufacturing base to a service-sector base as globalization
increases.1 48 Service-sector growth occurs at opposite ends of the
educational and earnings ranges: growth in service sector employment

occurs in high-educational, high-wage jobs and in low-educational, lowwage jobs. 149 At the same time, relatively low-education, manufacturing

jobs, especially unionized jobs, have traditionally come with higher pay,
better benefits, and more job protection than service-sector jobs. 5 ° With a
relative move from a manufacturing base to a service-sector base, and
keeping educational attainment steady, the jobs available to most welfare

recipients-when any jobs are available-increasingly come with lower pay,
fewer benefits, and greater instability. 15 1 These are not the kind of
economically viable and sustainable jobs that can support recipients over the

long term moving from welfare to work.
Between 1996 and 2006, the ten-year period of welfare reform, total

employment in the United States grew from 126,708,000 to 144,427,000-a
total increase of about 14% and an average annual increase of about 1.4%.152
Aggregate employment growth rates across all sectors varied over that
period, but total employment only declined between 2001 and 2002.15

148.

See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.

149.

See infra notes 154-55, 164-65, and accompanying text.

150.

See supranote 147.

151.

See id.

152. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the
Current Population Survey, 1996-2006, Employment Level (Not Seasonally Adjusted) and author's
calculations based upon those data. All U.S. Department of Labor data available at the U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics homepage, http://www.bls.gov/.
Seasonally adjusted gross job gains over that period varied dramatically. The economy
produced 7,679,000 jobs in the first quarter of 1996 and 7,509,000 jobs in the first quarter of 2007,
the last quarter for which data were available as of this writing. Over the eleven-year period, job
growth hit a high of 8,792,000 jobs in the first quarter of 2000 and a low of 7,396,000 jobs in the
third quarter of 2003. Seasonally adjusted gross job losses over the same period similarly varied
dramatically. Thus, the economy lost 7,476,000 jobs in the first quarter of 1996 and 7,071,000 jobs
in the first quarter of 2007. Job loss hit a high of 8,801,000 in the second quarter of 2001 and a low
of 6,905,000 in the first quarter of 2006. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Business Employment Dynamics, First Quarter 2007 21, available at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/cewbd.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2007).
153. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from the
Current Population Survey, 1996-2006, Employment Level (Not Seasonally Adjusted), availableat
HeinOnline -- 11 J. Gender Race & Just. 232 2007-2008

Welfare Reform in a Global Economy

Growth areas over the ten-year period were concentrated in higher-wage
management, professional, health-care, and financial occupations,' 54 on the
one hand, and lower-wage service-sector and construction occupations, on
the other.1 55 In contrast, employment in production occupations rose from
1996 to 2000, then fell dramatically between 2000 and 2006.156 Over the
entire ten-year period, the economy lost 1,120,000 production jobs,
representing an 11% drop over the period. 157 Although employment in other
occupations grew and declined at various points between 1996 and 2006,
only two other occupational groupings lost total jobs between 1996 and
2006: (1) farming, fishing, and forestry;1 58 and (2) production,
transportation, and material moving. 159 The New Labor Forum reported in
2006 that the United States has lost over 3.4 million manufacturing jobs
2001.160 More than one-half of
since 1998, including about 2.9 million since
61
those losses have been from union shops.'
http://www.bls.gov/data/home.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
154.
The employment level of management, professional, and related occupations increased
steadily over the ten-year period, out-performing the averages across all occupations, from an annual
employment level of 41,417,000 in 1996 to 50,420,000 in 2006-a total increase of 21% and an
average annual increase of about 2.1%. Similarly, the employment level of management, business,
and financial operations increased steadily from an employment level of 17,691,000 in 1996 to
21,233,000 in 2006-a total increase of 20% and an average annual increase of about 2.0%. U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics, 1996-2006,
availableat http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?bd (author's custom charts and calculations).
155.
Employment in service occupations increased steadily and out-performed the average total
increases, from an annual employment level of 19,578,000 in 1996 to 23,811,000 in 2006-a total
increase of nearly 22% and an average annual increase of nearly 2.2%. Employment in sales and
office occupations increased from 34,234,000 in 1996 to 36,141,000, a total increase of 5.6%; and
sales and related occupations increased from 14,841,000 in 1996 to 16,641,000 in 2006, a total
increase of 12%. Employment in construction and extract occupations grew from 7,225,000 in 1996
to 9,507,000 in 2006-a total increase of nearly 32%. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics, 1996-2006, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgibin/dsrv?bd (author's custom charts and calculations).
156.
Employment in production occupations started at 10,498,000 in 1996, grew to 11,463,000
in 2000, and then quickly and steadily declined to 9,378,000 in 2006. U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics, 1996-2006 available at
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?bd (author's custom charts and calculations).
157.

Author's calculation based on U.S. Department of Labor data.

Employment in farming, fishing, and forestry dropped from 1,117,000 in 1996 to 961,000
158.
in 2006. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Business Employment Dynamics,
1996-2006, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?bd (author's custom charts and
calculations).
159.
Employment in production, transportation, and material moving occupations fell from
18,940,000 in 1996 to 18,224,000 in 2006. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Business Employment Dynamics, 1996-2006, available at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/dsrv?bd
(author's custom charts and calculations).
160.
Bob Baugh & Joel Yudken, ManufacturingDiscontent: Is DeindustrializationInevitable?,
15 NEw LABOR FORUM 55, 56-57 (Summer 2006).
161.

Id. at 56.
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Projections for growth in the job market are consistent with these recent
historical trends. The Department of Labor projects total employment to
grow by 18.9 million jobs, or 13%, between 2004 and 2014.162 Employment
growth will be concentrated in the service sector, with educational services,
health care and social assistance, and professional and business services
seeing the strongest growth. 163 The Department projects that these sectors
will grow at more than twice the pace of the overall economy over this tenyear period. 164 Construction jobs, too, will grow, but at a somewhat slower

pace.'

65

employment, in contrast, is projected to decline 5%
Manufacturing
166

over that period.

The relative decline in the domestic manufacturing sector is also
reflected in domestic manufacturing investment. Domestic manufacturing
investment dropped nearly 17% in real terms between 1998 and 2004, and
investment in manufacturing structures declined 44% over the same
period. 167 New, potentially offsetting foreign investment mostly represents a

change in ownership of existing capacity, not new jobs or new production
facilities.1 68 At the same time, U.S. manufacturers were increasing their
investments overseas. Between 1990 and 2005, U.S. direct investment

abroad on a historical-cost basis' 69 increased from $430,521 million 1 to
70
$2,069,983 million-an increase of 381% over the fifteen-year period.
Between 1995 and 2005, U.S. direct investment abroad on a historical-cost

basis increased from $699,015 million to $2,069,983 million-an increase of

162. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001-2014
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.nr0.htm.

Employment

Projections,

available at

163.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Projections,
http://www.bls.gov/emp. Of special note, the Department projects a 21.2% increase in professional
and related occupations (from 28,544,000 in 2004 to 34,590,200 in 2014), including at least 20%
growth in computer and mathematical science occupations; community and social service
occupations; education, training, and library occupations; and healthcare practitioners and technical
occupations. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Projections,
http://www.bls.gov/emp.
164. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment
http://www.bls.gov/emp.

Projections.

165. The Department projects that construction jobs will grow from 6,974,500 in 2004 to
7,756,900 in 2014-a 12% total growth rate. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Employment Projections, http://www.bls.gov/emp.
166.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 162.

167.

Baugh & Yudken, supra note 160, at 57.

168.

Id. See infra notes 169-71 for data on foreign direct investment in the United States.

169. The U.S. Department of Commerce records data on a historical-cost basis and without
current cost adjustment. See http://bea.gov/lntemational/lndex.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
170. Author's calculation, based on U.S. Department
http://bea.gov/lnternational/Index.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2005).

of
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196% over the ten-year period.1 71 Many argue that increased U.S. foreign
direct investment ships U.S. manufacturing jobs overseas to cheaper labor
markets-that increased U.S. foreign direct investment proximately causes a
loss of manufacturing jobs in the United States. 72 Others argue that
increased U.S. foreign direct investment goes mainly to high income,
developed countries and simply reflects the larger trend away from
manufacturing and toward the service sector in the U.S. economy-that
foreign direct investment simply follows larger trends in the U.S. economy.
173 Still others adopt a middle position that U.S. foreign direct investment (in
the form of foreign outsourcing) may result in shifts in the composition of
domestic output and the domestic labor market but probably does not result
in aggregate changes of output or employment.174 Whatever the precise
relationship between foreign direct investment trends and the pattern in the
broader domestic economy moving away from manufacturing and toward
the service sector, foreign direct investment trends underscore the basic
economy story that the U.S. domestic economy is moving relatively away
from manufacturing and toward the service sector.
With employment growth in the service sector, the jobs that are and will
be available are of two types: (1) service-sector jobs with high educational
requirements and higher wages; and (2) service-sector jobs with low
educational requirements and lower wages. 175 Even a cursory examination of
the Department of Labor's anticipated growth occupations illustrates this.
The Department on the one hand projects high growth in business and
financial operations and in professional and related occupations, including
such high education and technical occupations as computers and
mathematics, legal occupations, and education.' 76 These jobs require higher

171.

Id.

172.
See generally Linda Levine, OFFSHORING (A.K.A. OFFSHORE OUTSOURCING) AND JOB
INSECURITY AMONG U.S. WORKERS, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. FOR CONG. ORD. CODE RS21118

(June 18, 2004) (describing the concern that offshoring caused a jobless recovery and is responsible
for the loss of U.S. jobs).
173.

See James K. Jackson, U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD: TRENDS AND CURRENT

ISSUES, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. FOR CONG. ORD. CODE RS 21118 (Apr. 26, 2006) (arguing that
U.S. foreign direct investments reflect, rather than cause, the broader trend from manufacturing to
the service sector in the U.S. economy).
174.

See Craig K. Elwell, FOREIGN OUTSOURCING: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY

RESPONSES, CONG. RES. SERV. REP. FOR CONG. (June 21, 2005) (arguing that U.S. foreign direct
investment (as outsourcing) has both destructive and creative aspects within the domestic economy,
but that it probably does not affect overall growth or employment rates).
175.

See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.

176. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Releases 2004-14
Employment Projections Summary, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.nrO.htm (last visited
Nov. 12, 2007).
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and specialized education but come, on average, with higher salaries. 77 On
the other hand, the Department projects growth in general service
occupations, including such occupations as healthcare support, food
preparation and serving, building and grounds cleaning and maintenance,
and personal care. 178 These jobs require lower levels of education and come,
on average, with much lower salaries, and since 2000 they have seen much
slower wage growth. 179 These latter service-sector jobs also often lack
meaningful health and retirement benefits and are often part-time, seasonal,
or otherwise unstable. 180 For similar educational requirements, these lowpaying service-sector jobs are crowding out higher-paid manufacturing
18
jobs.
The net result is that low paying jobs with poor benefits and little longterm stability have replaced-and are likely to continue to replace-better
paid manufacturing jobs for most welfare recipients, holding educational
levels steady.' 82 With a median weekly paycheck of $413 in 2005, even the
median wage service-sector job pays an annual rate of a mere $21,476 for a

177. Median weekly earnings for management, professional, and related occupations grew from
$810 in 2000 to $937 in 2005-nearly a 16% increase over the period. U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, Weekly and Hourly Earnings Data from the
Current Population Survey. The Department projects that some of these occupations will also see the
largest wage growth from 2004 to 2014. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS
Releases 2004-14 Employment Projections Summary, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.
nrO.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2007).
178. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS Releases 2004-14
Employment Projections Summary, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecopro.nr0.htm (last visited
Nov. 12, 2007).
179. Median weekly earnings for service occupations grew from $365 in 2000 to $413 in
2005-a 13% increase over that period. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Current Population Survey, Weekly and Hourly Earnings Data from the Current Population Survey.
The Department projects that many of these occupations will see the largest wage growth from 2004
to 2014, although they start much lower than the management, professional, and related occupations.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Projections, http://www.bls.gov/
emp.
180.

See supra note 147.

181. Median weekly earnings for production occupations grew from $471 in 2000 to $538 in
2005. U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Population Survey, Weekly and
Hourly Earnings Data from the Current Population Survey. Compare the same years for low
education service sector jobs, supranote 179.
182. The experience bears this out. Between 1996 and 2000, the breakdown of employed
former welfare recipients in the most common industries was as follows: nearly 18% of employed
former welfare recipients worked in "retail except eating and drinking"; 14.4% worked in "eating
and drinking places"; 7.4% worked in "manufacturing except printing"; 4.6% were in "personnel
supply services"; 3.7% were in "hotels and lodging places"; and fewer than 3.6% were in each of
"[l]abs home care," "[n]ursing and personal care facilities," "elementary and secondary schools,"
and "child day care services." The remaining 38.2% were in "other" industries. Heather Boushey &
David Rosnick, For Welfare Reform to Work, Jobs Must Be Available, Center for Economic and
Policy Research Issue Brief 3 (Apr. 1, 2004), available at http://www.cepr.net/publications/
welfare reform_2004 04.htm.
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52-week year (i.e., with no time off), 183 just marginally higher than the
poverty line for a family of four in 2005.184 And it probably comes with poor
benefits and little stability.185 This is hardly the kind of job that can take a
welfare recipient from welfare to work. With this kind of labor market, the
unforgiving federal work requirements will inevitably fail to move recipients
off welfare and into sustainable jobs.
IV. CONCLUSION

Because of the federalism and labor market tensions, welfare reform
cannot achieve its economic goals as a devolved welfare-to-work program
over the long term in a global economy. In a global economy, the federal
government-not the states-controls the primary instruments of influence
over the domestic labor market; states mostly take the labor market as they
receive it from federal policies in a global economic order. And the global
economic order seems to be creating domestic jobs for welfare recipients
that are lower paid, less stable, and without the kinds of benefits necessary
for long-term economic sustainability. The Deficit Reduction Act, with its
stricter workforce participation rates and its tighter rules on the use of
education and training as part of workforce participation, only exacerbates
these tensions because it prevents states from adopting real and meaningful
educational programs to move their welfare recipients into the higher wage
growth occupations that require specialized and advanced training. Under
the current law, these tensions will likely lead states simply and expediently
to place welfare recipients in the growing lower-wage service sector
occupations, making them permanent working poor and even rotating them
back into a cycle of poverty.
In order to succeed in moving recipients off welfare permanently, a
devolved welfare-to-work program must address these tensions. Most
importantly, it must significantly loosen workforce participation
186
requirements and the limits on the use of education and training as work.
If states are to place welfare recipients into long-term, economically
sustainable jobs in the growing higher-income service-sector occupations
that require higher and more specialized education, they must have the
flexibility to train recipients to perform in these jobs. If the federal

183.

Author's calculation, based on U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,

Current Population Survey, Weekly and Hourly Earnings Data from the Current Population Survey.
184.

The federal poverty line for a family of four in 2005 was $19,350. 70 Fed. Reg. 8374 (Feb.

18, 2005).
185.

See supranote 147.

186. These are but two changes called for by the tensions between welfare reform's priority of
work and the global economy. If welfare reform seriously seeks to promote economically sustainable
work, it must, of course, also provide greater child care support and other forms of support
recommended by participants in this Symposium.
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government seeks to devolve a welfare-to-work program to the states, it can
only succeed in a global economy by giving the states the full flexibility they
need to place their welfare recipients in a labor market that they largely
neither willed nor created.
Short of adopting more flexible workforce participation rate
requirements and education credits for work, welfare reform can only
resolve these tensions by becoming either a trade adjustment assistanceunemployment benefit program or a pure means-tested income support
program operated jointly by the federal and state governments, even through
something like a block grant. A trade adjustment assistance-unemployment
entitlement program could provide cash benefits and worker training or
retraining for individuals who demonstrate a layoff, lost job, or even an
inability to find an economically sustainable job in a domestic labor market
shaped by globalization. This approach would harmonize the program's
priority of work with the political and economic realities of globalization. In
other words, only this approach would resolve the federalism and labor
market tensions by recognizing that global forces help shape the domestic
labor market and that the labor market cannot always produce economically
sustainable jobs with the mathematical precision required by welfare reform.
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